Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action by Garth, Bryant G.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 3 Article 1
Summer 1987
Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action
Bryant G. Garth
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation




journal VoL. 62, No. 3
1Occc1C 1986-1987
SYMPOSIUM
Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action
BRYANT G. GARTH*
INTRODUCTION
Class actions rest on a relatively simple proposition: self-selected class
representatives and their lawyers, properly supervised by the court, can
represent class members as a group sufficiently well to overcome members'
individual rights to be heard. As a general, non-legal, principle, this statement
seems straightforward and even natural: interests are represented by persons
and institutions not necessarily selected by their constituencies in much of
everyday life.' As a legal principle, however, it excites considerably more
controversy. The flood of legal scholarship, here and abroad,2 on the class
action continues unabated. The work produced for this symposium shows
that we are as willing as ever to re-examine class actions. The fascination
of foreign scholars with class actions is fairly easy to explain: this principle
of representation remains unacceptable to almost the entire legal world
outside of the United States.3 The continuing preoccupation of proceduralists
* Dean and Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
1. On questions of representation in class action litigation, see, e.g., Garth, Conflict and
Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 492 (1982); Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469 (1984); Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part
II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067 (1980).
2. See, e.g., ONTAuo LAW REFORM ColMAIoN, REPORT ON CLAss AcnoNs (1982); Koch,
Class and Public Interest Actions in German Law, 5 CrV. JusT. Q. 66 (1986); Uff, Class,
Representative and Shareholders' Derivative Actions in English Law, 5 Crv. JusT. Q. 50 (1986).
3. See generally Cappelletti & Garth, Finding an Appropriate Compromise: A Comparative
Study of Individualistic Models and Group Rights in Civil Procedure, 2 Crv. JUST. Q. 111
(1983).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the United States, however, requires more thought. Surely it is no longer
the novelty of class actions as a legal matter in this country.
A better explanation takes us beyond class actions. My suggestion is that
much of the most instructive scholarship in this area uses the class action
to gain access to puzzling issues that underlie civil procedure itself. Class
actions are interesting but not just because they connote high powered and
fancy litigation. The reliance on an expanded principle of representation
highlights the conflicts and dilemmas of legal representation generally. In
addition, the swollen and somewhat distorted character of litigation in the
form of the class action enables us to see some features of ordinary litigation
that are normally hidden. While I do not want to exaggerate the lessons to
be learned, it is useful to see what can be found by looking at class actions
as a species of ordinary litigation.
Class actions from this perspective help us rethink some basics of civil
procedure. A number of fundamental procedural questions can be seen, for
example, in the discussions of: class actions collected for this symposium.
The most obvious of such questions include the following: What is a party?"
How important in a procedural system are such social values as law en-
forcement, economic efficiency, and access to the legal system?5 Can indi-
vidualized judicial systems serve a mass public? What should be the role of
lawyers as compared to the litigants? What kinds of factors affect the critical
decisions made by lawyers? What is the appropriate social role of the courts,
federal and state?6 Part of the appeal of class action research, it might be
noted, stems from the difficulty of these questions. They are not very much
fun to try to resolve in the abstract.
This Introduction in any event is not the place to try any overly ambitious
reconsideration of class actions, much less of civil litigation. If we take the
connection of class actions and ordinary litigation as an organizing theme,
however, a couple of interesting points might be made as a way to introduce
the following articles. First, the articles might be read more profitably if we
relate them to more than just the class action literature. Second, I can add
to the contributed articles a one-idea, mini-essay on class actions focusing-
on the problem of certification. And finally, perhaps stretching a bit, I shall
try to subject my mini-essay to the theme of this Introduction: what class
actions teach about ordinary litigation. The suggestion will be that we ought
to think about civil litigation more from the perspective of what will be
termed "settlement events."
4. See, e.g., J. VINRG, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978).
5. See, e.g., R. POSNER, Tim FEDERAL COURTS: Cmisis AND REFoma (1985); Resnik, Failing
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494 (1986).
6. See, e.g., F. JAsms & G. HAZARD, CIvIL PROCEDURE 279-300 (1986).
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I. CLASS ACTION ESSAYS AS STUDIES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Professor Sherman's article uses the class action to raise basic questions
that proceduralists have not dealt with well. He asks how courts in different
jurisdictions should resolve questions of duplicative litigation. While such
problems occurring on a small scale can often be ignored as a matter of
serious concern, we cannot avoid such questions when the choice is between
one swollen but manageable lawsuit and a series of individual suits set all
over the country and in different kinds of courts. Once we confront the
general concern in the class action setting, however, we can see that the
principles of analysis are essentially the same ones that could be developed
for other duplicative litigation. And they will become increasingly important
as courts get bombarded with repetitive situations and cases.
Professor Rosenburg's article addresses the related problems of justice in
settings of mass torts. He uses the context of class action litigation to wrestle
with the perplexing problem of how individual or private justice relates to
collective or bureaucratic justice. The class action poses the issue, which
relates to Professor Sherman's concern about when duplication should be
permitted or denied. The broad question is how resources should be allocated
between individualized, costly justice and a mass, wholesale form of justice. 7
Using class actions as a take-off point, Professor Rosenburg thus illuminates
the approaches that can be taken to particularly troubling cases like the
asbestos litigation, contamination by Agent Orange, and mass disasters such
as that involving Union Carbide in Bhopal.
Professor Wood's article indirectly raises a comparable question. How
much should we be permitted to draw in parties in order to concentrate
litigation into one proceeding? Her specific analysis concerns the difficulties
that have occurred in the application of principles of personal jurisdiction
to the class action context. As she points out, that analysis "in turn has
suggested ... more general difficulties [in the area of personal jurisdiction]." 8
The fragments and interests comprising class action "parties" raise questions
of the role of state sovereignty in personal jurisdiction and of which kinds
of interests can be bound from a distance in the name of efficiency.
Professor Coffee takes class action litigation and uses it to develop a new
wrinkle on the understanding of attorney behavior: how "agency costs" and
"asymmetrical stakes" affect the litigation choices and settlement conduct
of the parties and especially the lawyers. While specifically directed to class
actions, it is clear that the hypotheses he works with have considerable
explanatory power for much of ordinary litigation as well. There are specific
economic reasons to expect lawyers to make certain kinds of choices and
7. See, e.g., Calabresi, Access to Justice and Substantive Law Reform: Legal Aid for the
Lower Middle Class, in AccEss TO JUSTCE: EMERGING IssuEs AND PERSPECTIVES 169 (M.
Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1979).
8. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597 (1987).
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also to explain why clients may assert very little control over these choices.
Much empirical and theoretical work is needed to explore these incentives
and their impact on the world of lawyers and clients.
Finally, Professor Bogart, writing from a Canadian perspective, finds that
he cannot discuss class actions without moving quickly to the fundamental
questions about the role of the courts. The growing interest in class actions
in Canada relates in important respects to the transformation in courts
supported by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the system
of judicial review it brought. To return to a point raised earlier, the simple
legal principle underlying class actions gains appeal only where certain ideas
about courts also gain ascendancy. Britain, for example, has the same her-
itage of equity that we do in the United States, but the class action has
prospered out of that heritage here while becoming a relatively unimportant
feature of civil litigation in Britain.9
Each of these authors writes about the class action but inevitably confronts
more fundamental questions of civil litigation. The exaggerated events of
class litigation thus help us to see some more or less hidden questions about
civil courts and.society. Indeed, to make the point even more obvious, all
writers on the subject of class actions must somehow confront or finesse
the threshold questions, raised specifically by Professor Bogart, about the
appropriate role of the courts. One cannot really define the "function" of
the class action without considering the question of what courts are for. We
are in a period in the United States where the appropriate role of courts is
the subject of intense political debate.' 0
II. ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: CERTIFICATION AND SETTLEMENT IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Moving now to matters of empirical detail, this section will add a brief
discussion of the certification decision in class action litigation. This switch
in topics can be defended in several ways. Each of the other articles about
the United States relates closely to the court's decision whether or not to
certify a class. At that stage, the court specifies the contours of the class
and decides how far it will go to allow or defeat competing individual
lawsuits. For present purposes, however, I will draw more on the approach
taken by Professor Coffee before trying, as noted before, to relate findings
about certification to general themes in civil litigation.
In one sense the centrality of the certification decision is obvious." In the
federal courts or state courts with rules analogous to Federal Rule 23, a
lawsuit cannot proceed as a class action unless it is certified under one of
9. "English law has not so far developed a 'class' action of a kind similar to those already
existing or proposed in North America .... " Uff, supra note 2, at 60.
10. See sources cited supra notes 5-6; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
11. See 2 H. NEWBERG, CLASS AcTIoNs 2-12 (1985); MANUAL FOR Coisrax LITIGATON
(SECOND) § 30.1 (1985).
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the three subdivisions of 23(b). 12 There is no necessary reason why that
important decision should be more important than any other crucial pro-
cedural step, but the consensus is that certification is the major event. Some
empirical data collected as part of a study by Ilene Nagel, S. Jay Plager,
and myself of class action litigation in the Northern District of California,13
support this assertion and provide a starting point for further reflection.
First, most class actions, like most litigation, settle prior to trial. Of the
forty-six certified class actions 4 that we studied in the Northern District of
California, thirty-six were settled and ten litigated. While the number litigated
may seem high compared to non-class actions, five of the litigated class
actions involved governmental defendants. Governmental defendants, for a
variety of reasons, tend to litigate more often than private defendants. 5
What is much more striking, however, is that none of the seventy-three
uncertified class actions in the Northern District resulted in litigation. Eleven
were settled formally, thirty-two were dismissed, and defendants won sum-
mary judgment nineteen times. Plaintiffs succeeded in winning the non-class
suits only four times, through summary judgment. 6 The comparison between
the two sets of suits filed as class actions suggests very strongly that the
failure to win certification reduces the bargaining power of the plaintiff and
the will to continue the fight.
The importance of the certification decision is also made clear by the
attention paid to it by the litigants. According to our data, certification was
contested in thirty-five of the forty-six certified class actions; and obviously
it was not conceded in the actions that were not certified. The tactics used
to fight certification included the production of massive documents in op-
position and the use of quite aggressive discovery tactics; twenty-seven cases
involved at least one deposition of a named plaintiff; and it was not unusual
to attack all the elements of Rule 23 necessary for class certification. One
lawyer whom we interviewed characterized defense tactics as follows: first
they attack the plaintiff, next the competence of plaintiff's lawyers, and
then the ethics of plaintiff's lawyers. 7
12. The two most often used subdivisions are 23(b)(2) for primarily injunctive relief and
23(b)(3) for damages.
13. Grant No. SES 82-18926 from the National Science Foundation to a project entitled,
"Dispute Transformation and the Dynamics of Legal Representation in Class Action Litiga-
tion."
14. Our data actually refer to class action clusters: cases grouped together for purposes of
pretrial and trial proceedings.
15. The most obvious reasons stem from the fact that the government, as a "repeat-player
litigant," faces different incentives for litigation and settlement. See Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
16. The characteristics of certified and non-certified cases are discussed in Garth, Nagel, &
Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from the Empirical Study
of Class Action Litigation (unpublished manuscript). It should be noted that motions to certify
were not made in two-thirds of the uncertified cases, but that does not suggest less importance
for the decision, only that it became clear that certification would not be possible.
17. We have interview data from 43 plaintiffs' lawyers who handled class actions terminated
in the period 1979-1983.
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After the class certification struggle, however, the process somehow tends
to cool. The named plaintiff recedes into the background and the lawyers
for both sides begin to negotiate in earnest.' 8 The image recalls a border
dispute between two nations who fight a couple of battles very tenaciously
and then decide to negotiate a settlement on the basis of a mix of perceived
power and international principle. The battles may be extraordinarily hard
fought, but the contestants nevertheless are able to switch to a new stage
where the dispute is contested quite differently. Certainly there are exceptions
to this pattern, but the shift in approaches before and after certification is
pronounced enough to merit some explanation.
There are no obvious reasons for the centrality of the certification decision
in determining the parties' settlement behavior. Most of negotiation theory
contemplates a continuing reevaluation of a case as more expenditures are
made and more information obtained.' 9 While not necessarily wrong, that
approach requires some further elaboration to account for the dynamics of
settlements in class actions.
Some plausible reasons can be enumerated to explain the importance of
certification in the conduct of settlement discussions. (1) Class certification
makes such a difference in the settlement value of the case that defendants
will not take plaintiffs' claims seriously until certification is achieved. (2) The
result of certification is to clear up uncertainty. It lets the parties know just
how far the lawsuit extends in terms of the defendant's conduct, the number
of plaintiffs' potentially making claims, and the potential remedy. (3) The lawyers
on each side can demonstrate in the pre-certification skirmishes their quality
and commitment to the litigation. (4) By the time of certification, the parties
have some sense of the attitude of the trial judge to the case. (5) It is in the
interests of lawyers on both sides to clock a substantial number of billable hours
but not an "excessive" amount.2 0 (6) Settlements can be evaluated and com-
pared better if they are made at roughly the same stage of the lawsuit. (7) A
busy lawyer with a diverse portfolio of cases can manage the portfolio by check-
ing on the value of the investment at certain strategic times. (8) Finally, it may
be that the pattern of fight and settle, once set, assumes a kind of ritualistic
character that serves to reinforce the pattern.
All these factors require some specific investigation, even as applied to
class action litigation. For present purposes, however, I want to ask if this
approach suggests any lines of inquiry for ordinary litigation. Might we be
witnessing part of a more general phenomenon?
18. Sometimes, it should be noted, the parties see certification coming and negotiate a
settlement in conjunction with the certification.
19. On negotiation theory, see, e.g., H. RAnFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION
(1982); Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983
AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 905.
20. On the factors that affect lawyer effort in terms of hours, see H. Kritzer, W. Felstiner,
A. Sarat & D. Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort (Disputes Processing
Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working Paper 7-3, 1984).
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III. SETTLEMENT EVENTS: A NEGLECTED PERSPECTIVE?
There has been a tremendous surge of interest recently in the settlement
of civil litigation prior to trial on the merits. One focus has been on the
managerial behavior of judges.21 Another has been on new mechanisms that
provide an alternative trial-like proceeding, such as the summary jury trial,
or court-annexed arbitration. What has happened to these experiments,
however, is that they are defended less because they put a stop to the
proceeding and more because they somehow precipitate settlements. For
example, court-annexed arbitration is economically viable only if the vast
percentage of the non-mandatory arbitration proceedings is not appealed to
a trial de novo. It turns out that appeals typically are filed, but then the
cases are settled out of court. 2 The arbitration experiment, like the mana-
gerial judge, is then praised mainly for the contribution to the settlement
process.
As critics have noted, however, it is not clear whether any of these artifices
actually increases the settlement rate.24 The percentage of settlement in civil
litigation has been very high for some time, and it has not changed signif-
icantly with these innovations. It is tough to develop data to see who is
right, but we might clarify the matter by borrowing from the preceding
discussion of class action certification and settlements. Perhaps these two
positions on alternative mechanisms to promote settlement can be explained
by thinking more about what can be termed the "settlement event." It is
quite possible that the new mechanisms are quite effective in promoting
settlements but still have no impact on settlement rates.
A settlement event can be defined as a point in the litigation process that
generates serious settlement negotiations. Mandatory arbitration or concili-
ation may or may not be such an event. The 120-year French experience
with mandatory conciliation, inspired by the ideals of the French revolution,
suggests that conciliation failed miserably and became just another for-
mality. Commentators suggested that the parties and counsel simply knew
too little about their own cases and those of their opponents at the time of
conciliation to allow meanisigful negotiations. Conciliatory talk is not enough
if parties are not positioned to settle. French conciliation did not become a
successful settlement event.
21. See, e.g., Galanter, ".... A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge:" Judicial Mediation
in the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'y 1 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement:
Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
22. See Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-
Stage Discovery Planning, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 235 (1985).
23. See, e.g., E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT CoURTs (1983).
24. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 417-31 (1982).
25. The grande conciliation before the French tribunal civil was required from the mid-
19th century until 1949. Reportedly only nine percent of such conciliation attempts in later
years, such as 1942, ended with successful conciliation. See Thery, Access to Justice in France,
in AccEss TO JUSTICE: A VoR SURVEY 479, 510 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1978).
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On the other side, however, the settlement event need not be one designed
explicitly with the idea of promoting settlement. My suggestion is that the
certification decision in class actions is one such event, and the question is
whether there are analogs in ordinary litigation. We might look to see if
factors such as those mentioned in the context of class certification apply
to certain events of ordinary litigation. Such events, for example, would
(1) affect substantially the potential value of a settlement; (2) clarify uncertainty
about the value of the case; (3) allow lawyers to demonstrate their quality and
commitment; (4) let lawyers gauge the approach of the judge; and (5) permit
lawyers to work the number of hours they believe is economically appropriate.
If these factors promote settlement linked to certain events, such as certain
motions like summary judgment, then a further dynamic can be hypothesized.
First, the lawyer would gain more information cheaply by being able to
compare settlements at similar stages of lawsuits, thus facilitating decisions
on whether or not proposals are desirable. Second, and probably more
significantly, lawyers could manage their portfolio of cases by evaluating
cases only at certain strategic times. No one has the time to evaluate every
case or investment continuously. Settlement events can become convenient
times to take a look at the case as a lawyer investment. And finally, it may
also make sense to see these events as becoming parts of customary practice
or litigation ritual.
We can thus theorize why there might be particular settlement events in
ordinary litigation, and the class action certification material at least suggests
the idea has explanatory power in certain cases. 26 The next question is what
this perspective adds to existing debates on civil procedure and civil litigation.
An understanding of how settlement events work may enable us to avoid
"reforms" that may or may not themselves work better. Some aspects of
ordinary litigation, for example, may generate settlements better than a novel
reform such as court-annexed arbitration. The reform, as noted before, may
'not serve well as a settlement event. Unfortunately, we tend now to evaluate
the settlement-inducing power only of artifices designed to pressure parties
explicitly toward settlement. Neglecting the ordinary processes may cause us
26. There is also evidence of shortcuts to settlement in other cases. See, e.g., H. Ross,
SETTLED OuT oF COURT (2d ed. 1980); M. Melli, H. Erlanger & E. Chambliss, The Process of
Negotiation: An Explanatory Investigation in the Divorce Context 15-16 (Disputes Processing
Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working Paper 7-1, 1985) (suggesting how
in the divorce context 82% of parties tend to stipulate a final child support award based only
on a temporary order designed specifically not to influence the final order); see also H. Kritzer,
The Form of Negotiation in Ordinary Litigation 27 (Disputes Processing Research Program,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working Paper 7-2, 1985) (noting, inter alia, that "negotia-
tion in most cases involves two or fewer exchanges of offers and counteroffers"); H. Kritzer,
The Lawyer as Negotiator: Working in the Shadows 12-15 (Disputes Processing Research Pro-
gram, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working Paper 7-4, 1986) (suggesting how decisions
on motions by the judge "might be instrumental in leading to a settlement").
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to contrive events that raise the costs to parties without improving the
settlement rate, or to coerce the parties when they ordinarily would not have
needed such external pressure to settle. Neither of those alternatives is very
attractive. We should understand the settlement processes better before add-
ing all kinds of new devices and changing judicial behavior. There may not
be a problem to solve, or at least there may be less intrusive solutions.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to conclude this Introduction with anything definitive. We
have a serious literature on class actions, which I think is further enriched
by the articles in this symposium. We also are in a period of tremendous
intellectual ferment about civil litigation, the role of lawyers, and the role
of courts. Both kinds of scholarly literature are made much stronger by a
sense of detail and of the actual behavior of lawyers and clients. I have
tried to draw on these three kinds of approaches in this Introduction, but
have not had the time or space to develop the ideas sketched preliminarily
here. I hope to persuade readers that this kind of inquiry makes sense and
justifies more attention than can be focused here. I hope also that tentative
ideas mentioned specifically will justify further investigation. Thinking of
class certification as one of many possible settlement events may turn out
to allow us to understand the processes of ordinary litigation better and
prevent mistakes that come from a neglect of those processes.
1987]

